

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

|                               |   |  |
|-------------------------------|---|--|
| DARREN E. RICHARDSON, et al., | : | Civil Action No. 06- <del>2340</del> (DMC) |
|                               | : | 2460                                       |
| Plaintiffs,                   | : |  |
|                               | : |  |
| v.                            | : | OPINION                                    |
|                               | : |  |
| MORRIS COUNTY CORRECTIONAL    | : |  |
| FACILITY, et al.,             | : |  |
|                               | : |  |
| Defendants.                   | : |  |

Appearances:

Plaintiffs, pro se  
Darren E. Richardson  
Terique Jones  
Omar Thomas  
Kenneth Daniels  
Jose Rodriguez  
Morris County Correctional Facility  
43 John Street  
Morristown, NJ 07960-4237

**CAVANAUGH, District Judge:**

Darren E. Richardson, Terique Jones, Omar Thomas, Kenneth Daniels, and Jose Rodriguez, inmates of Morris County Correctional Facility in Morristown, New Jersey, have submitted this Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and have asked the Court to allow them to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.<sup>1</sup> This requires the Court to determine whether Fed.R.Civ.P. 20

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<sup>1</sup> An application to proceed in forma pauperis was submitted by Plaintiff Darren E. Richardson, only.

authorizes the joinder of these claims and plaintiffs and, if so, how to assess the filing fee required under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b).

1. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs assert a series of claims challenging cell searches and strip searches conducted on prisoners in Pre-hearing Detention or Disciplinary Detention, no Saturday mail services, the law library, the adequacy of vegetarian meal trays, and the footwear provided to prisoners.

II. ANALYSIS

Title 28 section 1915 governs proceedings in forma pauperis and imposes special limitations with respect to in forma pauperis actions brought by prisoners. Rule 20 governs permissive joinder of parties and provides, in pertinent part, that "[a]ll persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all these persons will arise in the action."

Two Circuit Courts of Appeals have analyzed the interrelationship of § 1915 and Rule 20. In Hubbard v. Haley, 262 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1136 (2002), the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the language of § 1915(b)(1), that "the prisoner shall be required to pay the full amount of a filing fee," requires each

prisoner to bring a separate suit and, to the extent that statutory language actually conflicts with Rule 20, the statute repeals the rule.

The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, however, found no irreconcilable conflict between § 1915(b)(1) and Rule 20 and held that district courts must accept complaints filed by multiple prisoners if the criteria of permissive joinder are satisfied. Bor-boune v. Berge, 391 F.3d 852 (7th Cir. 2004). Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit held that each prisoner joining in a multiple-prisoner civil action must pay the full filing fee in order to comply with the clear language of § 1915(b)(1) and to satisfy the financial incentive of the statute to deter frivolous prisoner actions. 391 F.3d at 855-56.

Whether or not there is an inherent conflict between § 1915(b) and Rule 20, at least two district courts have found that the impracticalities inherent in multiple-prisoner litigation militate against the permissive joinder allowed by Rule 20. See Wasko v. Allen County Jail, 2006 WL 978956 (N.D.Ind. 2006); Swenson v. MacDonald, 2006 WL 240233 (D. Mont. 2006). Among the difficulties noted by these courts are the need for each plaintiff to sign the pleadings, and the consequent possibilities that documents may be changed as they are circulated or that prisoners may seek to compel prison authorities to permit them to gather to discuss the joint

litigation. These two district courts have also noted that jail populations are notably transitory, making joint litigation difficult. A final consideration for the District Court for the District of Montana was the possibility that "coercion, subtle or not, frequently plays a role in relations between inmates." Swenson, 2006 WL 240233, \*4.

This Court finds the reasoning of these district courts persuasive. Prisoners are not in the same situation as non-prisoner joint plaintiffs; prisoners' circumstances make joint litigation exceptionally difficult.

In addition, Plaintiffs here have asserted claims that require individualized screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). For example, Plaintiffs challenge the failure to post a law library schedule and to provide adequate access to federal case law. The Court construes this as an attempt to state a claim for violation of the right of access to the courts. To state such a claim, however, a prisoner must show that prison officials caused him past or imminent "actual injury." See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 348-55 and n.3 (1996); Oliver v. Fauver, 118 F.3d 175, 177-78 (3d Cir. 1997). Thus, each prisoner must allege injury to him in order to state a claim. Joinder of their claims, however, would permit all Plaintiffs to avoid the risk of a "strike" under § 1915(g) if even one Plaintiff states a claim, because § 1915(g) imposes a strike only if the entire action is

dismissed. For all of the foregoing reasons, joinder is not appropriate.

Rule 21 provides that "[p]arties may be dropped [from a case] ... on such terms as are just." It would not be just merely to dismiss all but the lead Plaintiff from this case. Instead, this Court will direct the Clerk to open a separate case for each of the other Plaintiffs in this action. Each of the Plaintiffs will be granted leave to file an amended complaint asserting his individual claims.

Nothing in this Opinion should be construed as precluding any or all of the Plaintiffs from cooperating to the extent that they are able or as preventing consolidation of these cases for trial if that becomes appropriate at a later date.

### III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, this Court finds that joinder of Plaintiffs' claims under Rule 20 is not suitable. An appropriate Order follows.

S/ Dennis M. Cavanaugh  
Dennis M. Cavanaugh  
United States District Judge

Dated: 5/31/06